International Affairs 94: 3, 2018 would be issued mainly in renminbi; Chinese companies would be prioritized in the awarding of contracts; and China would contribute 50 per cent of the AIIB's capital stock, giving it veto power. 11 The Obama administration harnessed these reports to attack the AIIB's legitimacy. 12 Realists saw the picture they painted as evidence of China's 'revisionist' challenge to global governance. 13 The AIIB's eventual design does indeed distinguish it somewhat from existing MDBs. Its sole focus is on infrastructure development, not poverty reduction; loans are extended at commercial rates, and recipients are required to demonstrate repayment capacity as part of the business case for projects funded; 14 nine of the twelve directorships are reserved for Asian members; the board of directors, and the larger board of governors, are non-resident, potentially affording the bank's management more operational freedom than in other MDBs; and China's 26.6 per cent of the AIIB's vote share does give it veto power over decisions requiring a super-majority, though this excludes most operational matters, including project approvals. 15 Nonetheless, most careful observers have concluded that the AIIB's structure, governance and operating procedures closely mirror those of other MDBs. 16 This assessment is supported by the AIIB's collaboration with these MDBs on projects: at the time of writing (November 2017), the great majority of the AIIB's active projects were co-funded with these institutions and accordingly governed by their rules (see table 1). Furthermore, there is no indication that China seeks to dominate the AIIB. 17 In short, the AIIB appears consistent with the global governance status quo. Liberal and constructivist scholars have thus argued that the AIIB reflects China's pursuit of international status and legitimacy. 18 We concur that there is little in the AIIB to indicate a serious challenge to the existing MDBs, and that 'revisionist' claims therefore appear misplaced. However, we do not accept the 'status quo' argument either. If the AIIB's design was indeed driven by a search for international legitimacy and status, why has the new bank subsequently been marginalized in the financing of China's much-vaunted 'belt and road initiative' (BRI), for which it was ostensibly created? 19 The AIIB is hardly 22 The AIIB's marginalization is puzzling, regardless of whether one thinks the institution was created to challenge US hegemony or to improve China's standing within the existing global order. To explain this conundrum, and to assess the real extent of China's challenge to global governance, we must look beyond the AIIB, situating it within the broader context of China's IDF domain.
Others, most recently de Jonge, have noted the domestic roots of the AIIB and BRI, arguing that both appear to have been initiated to alleviate China's industrial and labour overcapacity problem. 23 We agree. But such accounts do not explain how this broad policy orientation is translated into actual funding decisions; why the AIIB receives such a small share of the BRI pie; or, indeed, what the implications are for China's effects on global governance in this area. We argue that the transformation of the Chinese party-state-its fragmentation, decentralization and internationalization-and the effects of that transformation on China's external behaviour, pose a more serious challenge to existing development financing norms than the AIIB. 24 The AIIB is a minor actor in China's crowded, fragmented and poorly coordinated IDF landscape, alongside-and, crucially, competing withpolicy and commercial banks, functional ministries, provincial governments and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is contestation among these agencies that will determine China's real challenge to the global governance of development, and that challenge will often be more chaotic and less strategic than is conventionally assumed.
In the following section, we describe how China's state transformation has created a fragmented, poorly coordinated IDF governance domain. We then show how this has consigned the AIIB to a marginal role, and draw out the implications for China's challenge to global governance. Foreign aid is formulated and implemented through a complex web of government and non-government actors at state, provincial and local levels jostling for space and influence. Their actions and agendas are often non-complementary if not outright contradictory.
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This judgement applies equally to other forms of Chinese IDF. This section briefly introduces the 'Chinese-style regulatory state' that provides the context for IDF policy-making and implementation. 26 This analysis explains why the AIIB is just one, relatively small, player in a diverse, poorly coordinated and contested policy domain.
The Chinese-style regulatory state
IR's characterization of China as a 'highly centralised country', whose authoritarian regime 'ensures top-down decision-making', 27 ignores the work of many Sinologists who have noted the fragmentation, decentralization and internationalization of the Chinese party-state since the 'reform' era began in the late 1970s, and the impact of these trends on China's international behaviour.
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The post-1978 fragmentation and decentralization of authority-largely driven by piecemeal reforms to boost economic development-have substantially broadened the domain of foreign policy-making and implementation. In the 1980s, provincial governments gained extensive control over resources and policy, including in respect of foreign economic relations, and despite some recentralization the situation is akin to 'de facto federalism'. 29 Provincial governments frequently act in quasi-autonomous ways abroad, typically in competitive pursuit of local economic development. 30 Meanwhile, following extensive privatization of smaller SOEs, larger ones were consolidated and 'corporatized', converted into primarily profit-seeking entities with arm's-length management. 31 they were encouraged to 'go out' to seek new markets and externalize China's massive surplus capacity. 32 Thanks to weak oversight, SOEs have often behaved illegally and rapaciously while nonetheless claiming to be implementing Chinese foreign policy. 33 Other formerly domestic state apparatuses have also been internationalized, including some ministries, regulators and law-enforcement agencies, often with overlapping remits and poor coordination.
Today, although the senior party leadership-notably President Xi-sets the overall direction for China's foreign policy, 34 state transformation processes have affected how leaders' influence becomes manifest in practice. The top leadership's control is not usually exercised in a 'top-down' manner, but rather reflects the emergence of a 'Chinese-style regulatory state'. 35 Senior leaders primarily employ regulatory means to shape Chinese foreign policy, with varying degrees of success. These include the issuing of broad guidelines for others to interpret and implement; attempts to coordinate and 'steer' diverse actors; and, on occasion, the use of coercion to discipline underlings' errant behaviour. 36 Top-level guidelines are typically left vague to accommodate the diverse interests now operating through the party-state. Rather than carefully specified strategies, they are typically 'platitudes, slogans, catchphrases, and generalities', offering 'atmospheric guidance' that others then interpret.
37 President Xi's opaque statements on 'the China dream', 'maritime rights' and the BRI itself are all in this vein. 38 This enables actors to interpret guidelines in ways that suit themselves and their allies, which may diverge from others' interests and even senior leaders' intentions. Attempts are made to coordinate these actors, particularly through Politburo or State Council 'leading small groups' (LSGs). However, these bodies are themselves fragmented and overlapping, and their capacity to generate coherent policy outputs is questioned, even under Xi's personal leadership. 39 To be sure, the party-state-especially the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself-retains powerful levers to incentivize compliance with central directives and deter serious malfeasance. These include discretionary control over regulations and finance; the appointment, appraisal and promotion of key personnel; and disciplinary mechanisms. If particular actors stray too far from the party line, top leaders can deploy their control mechanisms, disciplining or purging cadres, issuing tighter guidelines or seeking to recentralize authority. However, these mechanisms are never fully successful, as can be seen in continued struggles over foreign policy, 40 and non-implementation of Xi's policies, even as he cracks down on corruption and seeks to recentralize power. 41 Indeed, the extensive deployment of these mechanisms puts at risk the functioning and even the survival of the party-state itself. Rather than constituting a decisive move to reassert authority, therefore, these tactics are part of an ongoing 'tug-of-war'.
China's fragmented IDF domain
China's IDF domain reflects the emergence of the Chinese-style regulatory state described above. Like Chinese foreign policy more generally, development financing is in part 'steered' by vague announcements from senior leaders. BRI is the obvious example. Others include China's pledges of US$60 billion for Africa in 2015 and US$2 billion for the Pacific islands in 2013. These announcements lack concrete detail. Accordingly, how funds are actually spent (if at all) is determined by competition among diverse party-state actors, including ministries, banks, local governments and SOEs. This produces incoherent, even contradictory, outcomes.
Several national ministries are involved in translating the senior leadership's pronouncements into concrete policy. The main competition involves the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). The MFA sees IDF as a tool to advance China's diplomatic and geostrategic objectives. MOFCOM, however, is ostensibly primarily responsible for China's international economic relations, and typically uses IDF to support Chinese commercial endeavours. 42 Most research suggests MOFCOM is dominant, disregarding the MFA except when it needs a 'diplomatic problem-solver' when things go wrong. 43 Many other national-level agencies are also involved. Various functional ministries and agencies, including the ministries of health, education, transport, culture, agriculture, and science and technology, have substantial aid budgets beyond MOFCOM's reach. 44 The powerful National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is also frequently involved, particularly when IDF is linked to foreign investment and development lending: for example, it led in producing the BRI master-plan. 40 However, policy-making ministries are disconnected from funding bodies. Although MOFCOM manages grants and concessional loans, the funds are held by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). In the past, MOF has refused to cooperate with MOFCOM, for example declining to disclose other ministries' aid budgets ahead of the 2011 foreign aid white paper. 45 But MOF does not actually determine the IDF budget's extent: this is the role of the NDRC. 46 China's policy banksthe Exim Bank and CDB-are also important actors. The Exim Bank provides the concessional loans that now comprise over half of China's total aid programme (MOF covers the gap between concessional and commercial rates), along with other forms of IDF, such as export credits. The CDB provides non-concessional development financing, having recently shifted from a purely domestic to an international role. Although, as policy banks, the CDB and Exim Bank are meant to serve the government's agenda, both have sought to maintain profitable balance sheets, insisting on commercial loan rates.
47 Accordingly, despite political pressure to support major initiatives like 'going out' or BRI, they assess investment risk independently and have on some occasions refused credit. 48 The relationship between the two banks is complex-they cooperate on some projects while competing over others. 49 Major state-owned commercial banks also frequently provide commercial-rate loans for development-related projects. Importantly, both policy and commercial banks operate quasi-autonomously owing to a shift towards Chinese-style regulatory governance in the financial sector. 50 The final, and perhaps most important, element is the many, mostly stateowned, companies involved in implementing Chinese-funded projects, largely in the infrastructure and construction sectors: too numerous to list exhaustively, they include, for example, China Railway Construction, Sinosteel, China Energy Investment Corporation and China Communications Construction. Chinese IDF is overwhelmingly 'tied', designed to funnel resources and contracts towards Chinese firms-the AIIB being a notable exception. The capacity of central agencies to regulate the overseas conduct of SOEs is increasingly recognized as weak. 51 Development projects conform to this general picture; indeed, Zhang and Smith argue that the 'tail wags the dog', with SOEs able to direct IDF to their own benefit. 52 This situation stems partly from the deliberately 'recipient-led' nature of Chinese IDF, whereby applications for projects come from would-be recipient countries. To secure overseas business, Chinese companies often lobby foreign governments to apply for funded projects that these companies would be well positioned to implement. Provincial governments also lobby national-level agencies on behalf of locally owned SOEs. Accordingly, Chinese IDF disbursements on particular projects are driven largely by lobbying, competition among SOEs and commercial considerations, not top-down direction for geopolitical purposes. 53 Indeed, cut-throat competition among companies often compromises project quality, leading to the violation of environmental and labour regulations and creating social unrest and diplomatic 'blowback' for China. 54 Chinese leaders have attempted to coordinate this fragmented governance domain. However, it is unclear whether IDF falls within the remit of the foreign affairs LSG, the finance and economy LSG, the BRI LSG or-as seems likely, given the usual tussles-all of them. 55 The potential overlap is characteristic of the partystate's fragmentation: Lampton remarks that '[LSGs] too need coordination'. 56 In the State Council, MOFCOM, MFA and MOF established a liaison mechanism in 2008 which in 2011 was formalized as the Inter-Agency Foreign Aid Coordination Mechanism.
57 By 2012, reflecting the vast number of actors involved, this mechanism included 33 agencies. 58 However, given the different agendas and interests at stake, and the lack of any decisive authority in such modes of governance, practical coordination remains limited.
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MOFCOM's efforts to steer other actors through regulatory mechanisms have also been largely ineffective. In 2002, for example, MOFCOM issued new rules to evaluate aid projects, but 'assessment reports did not become available and … it is still usually not discernible whether they have had an impact or not'. 60 Likewise, in 2014, MOFCOM released 'Measures for the Administration of Foreign Aid'-the first comprehensive set of regulations on China's foreign aid. 61 However, there is no evidence that these made a substantial difference to other agencies' practices.
The same is true of efforts to improve regulation of SOEs' activities abroad, following repeated scandals and damage to China's international relations. 64 Whether this latest attempt will have any significant consequences is doubtful. The underlying problem is China's fragmented regulatory mode of governance. As Tan-Mullins and colleagues conclude with respect to environmental and social regulations in overseas investment, central regulations are 'confined to vague and broad legislative requirements spread over a cross section of foreign investment laws and operational guidelines which have no means of enforcement or follow through'. 65 The fact that regulations on overseas investment were tightened yet again in August 2017-because, in the words of the governor of the People's Bank of China (PBC), some SOE investments 'do not meet our industrial policy requirements . . . are not of great benefit to China and have led to complaints abroad'-suggests a centre still struggling to effect change, even under 'strongman' Xi. 66 Moreover, this ostensible tightening has occurred alongside the increasing decentralization of overseas investment approvals to provincial-level MOFCOM and NDRC offices, and the removal of State Council scrutiny of overseas projects exceeding US$200 million.
To summarize, China's IDF policy-making and implementation are fragmented and incoherent. Authority and resources are dispersed, and the regulatory mechanisms established to coordinate and steer them are weak. Top leaders can influence aid disbursement in various ways, but coherent, strategic direction for geopolitical or diplomatic purposes is challenged by state transformation dynamics. Overall, the institutional structure is systematically biased towards assisting China's economic development, creating ample opportunities for Chinese companies to manoeuvre IDF to suit their commercial interests.
Implications for the AIIB and China's challenge to global governance
The analysis presented above has two important implications. First, the focus on the AIIB is misguided. Set in the wider context of Chinese IDF, the AIIB is condemned to be a marginal player; accordingly, scrutinizing its institutional set-up and mission tells us little about Chinese intentions in this domain. China's leadership may have played up the AIIB's significance, but the size of its funding compared with other Chinese agencies tells a different story. This resonates with Breslin Beijing's official statements. 67 Second, the focus on state transformation dynamics provides better guidance on the extent of China's challenge to established IDF practices and governance-and the picture is not encouraging for supporters of the 'status quo' argument. The fragmented, contested IDF field is generating, and will continue to generate, behaviour that violates established norms. But, pace both 'revisionist' and 'status quo' interpretations, this does not necessarily reflect a strategic decision by China's senior leadership. We demonstrate these points with reference to BRI, the 'trillion-dollar' centrepiece of China's IDF agenda, which the AIIB was ostensibly established to support. 68 Contrary to common perceptions of calculated strategic direction, 69 BRI's implementation is highly fragmented. Aside from the AIIB, it involves a wide range of regulatory and funding agencies, listed in table 2.
Compared to other agencies, especially the policy and commercial banks, the AIIB is and will remain a marginal player. The AIIB has US$100 billion of 'authorized' capital but, as of June 2017, only US$18.46 billion of actual 'paid in' capital available for lending, scheduled to rise to US$20 billion by 2024. 70 The AIIB has already deployed 18.8 per cent of its available assets for the next six years, and only 29.7 per cent of this-just 5.6 per cent of its total available capital-is devoted to BRI projects (see table 1). Miller estimates that even if the AIIB and NDB combined invested 45-75 per cent of their equity in BRI projects, this would comprise only US$15-20 billion of lending annually by the early 2020s-barely a quarter of existing MDB financing. 71 The entities providing funds to the AIIB apparently prefer to retain control of their far larger reserves, or funnel them through other vehicles not subject to the same restrictions. In July 2015, a SAFE-owned investment vehicle named Chinese Parasol Tree Investment Platform Co. injected US$38 billion into the CDB for BRI projects. 72 This one investment alone is more than double the AIIB's available capital. By the end of 2016, the CDB and Exim Bank had overseas loan portfolios of US$329 billion and US$346 billion respectively, reporting BRI-related lending of US$101.8 billion in 2016, 73 and US$200 billion of investments in BRI countries by May 2017. 74 China's commercial banks also To be sure, Chinese banks are likely padding these figures to curry political favour with the government: as with the AIIB, only part of this lending may be directed towards building transboundary infrastructure, as ostensibly envisaged in the BRI programme. But that itself illustrates the point we are making here. How development financing occurs under BRI will be powerfully shaped by how various actors interpret and act upon vague central policy initiatives, in line with their sectional interests-interests that are in many cases primarily commercial, not geostrategic. Moreover, even if only a fraction of policy and commercial banks' lending is going to 'true' BRI projects, it still clearly dwarfs the AIIB's involvement. Indeed, just one US$5 billion loan made in 2015-from the Bank of China to the SOE Anhui Conch Cement, to support its BRI endeavours-is double the value of AIIB's total global loan portfolio. 77 Accordingly, any assessment of China's challenge to the global governance of IDF that focuses exclusively or even primarily on the AIIB is grossly deficient. It is certainly useful to know whether the AIIB is underpinned by 'revisionist' or 'status quo' governance principles, but because it controls only a tiny fraction of Chinese IDF this tells us very little about how far China is complying with or seeking to revise existing global governance principles. A proper assessment of the latter question requires us to examine all the entities involved and the governance system in which they are embedded. This exercise generates a more alarming picture than the one painted by 'status quo' accounts of the AIIB, but for different reasons from those suggested by 'revisionists'.
Among the diverse development financing actors identified above, only the AIIB abides by DAC principles in internal governance and environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA). 78 The Silk Road Fund also claims to abide by 'internationally accepted standards and guidelines' but provides no further detail, rendering this claim dubious. 79 As noted above, despite repeated tightening, the regulation of Chinese firms' overseas investment practices remains loose, ineffective and well below 'best practice' relating to development projects. Chinese firms are required to conduct ESIAs and abide by local laws and customs, but evidence exists of both provincially and centrally managed SOEs violating these regulations, with 75 and Chhay Areng (Cambodia), which caused such strong societal backlash that they were suspended; and special economic zones (SEZs), such as the as Golden Triangle in Laos, which are associated with land grabs and have often become dens of organized crime.
Moreover, even these limited Chinese standards are not consistently enforced. For example, one centrally managed SOE, China Power Investment Corporation, was able to obtain loans from the CDB and Exim Bank, plus approval from the NDRC and State Council, for the construction of dams on Myanmar's Irrawaddy River before an ESIA was completed. This plan led to fierce local resistance, contributed to the resumption of civil war in Kachin state and caused a crisis in Sino-Myanmar relations. 87 Accordingly, in their most recent, detailed review of CDB and Exim policies, Friends of the Earth notes a positive trajectory on paper, but a failure to develop 'independent accountability mechanisms and other means to ensure consistent enforcement of these . . . policies'. 88 The Chinese government's own data show half of Chinese firms operating in BRI countries failing to conduct social impact assessments before commencing their projects, while over a third are neglecting environmental impact assessment. Ignorance of local regulations is also rife, suggesting widespread violation of basic Chinese rules. 89 The suspension of a US$1 billion hydropower dam project on Mongolia's Eg River in 2016, following Russian protests about the downstream environmental impact, suggests the persistence of serious problems even in high-profile projects. 90 Similarly, the Kyaukphyu SEZ, a major BRI project in Myanmar, is already facing allegations of illegal land grabs, 91 suggesting that few lessons have been learned from previous Chinese 'development' projects in that country.
Chinese lenders are also often out of step with international standards regarding recipients' repayment capacity. Kaplan, for example, shows that Chinese development lending to Latin American countries has not declined as the fiscal position of the various governments has deteriorated. 92 Whereas China has been accused of pushing borrowers towards debt stress, 93 continued lending can usefully allow governments to avoid painful cuts to public services during economic downturns. But given the competitive context in which Chinese overseas lending decisions are made, especially those related to BRI, there is a genuine risk of recipients amassing unsustainable debt.
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Crucially, these deviations from global governance norms stem not from any strategic intent to overthrow western-based rules, but rather from prior and continuing transformations of, and struggles within, the Chinese party-state. Some entities within the Chinese polity-such as the MFA, MEP and PBCclearly recognize the risk to China's capital and diplomatic interests from poorly regulated IDF flows, and are accordingly promoting tighter regulation. However, the fragmentation of this policy domain, and the attempted shift towards regulatory governance, make it difficult for these agencies to effect decisive change. They are competing against powerful entities primarily interested in promoting Chinese business interests overseas and/or reaping profits, such as MOFCOM, the NDRC, banks, SOEs and provincial governments. Reflecting the emergence of a Chinese-style regulatory state, these struggles have seen the development of new guidelines designed to 'steer' the system in a more sustainable direction, but not the emergence of strong enforcement capacities or particular agencies wielding effective authority. Indeed, with respect to BRI specifically, the regulatory system is loose, with dozens of actors involved. 94 Although a State Council LSG for advancing the development of BRI was formed in late 2014 or early 2015, its membership appears to be small, excluding key agencies, and its remit overlaps with several others, notably the finance and foreign affairs LSGs. Accordingly, contra 'status quo' accounts, despite the creation of the AIIB Chinese IDF will continue to be incoherent, even contradictory, producing outcomes clashing with prevailing liberal principles. But this will not necessarily reflect a plot to challenge western dominance, as in 'revisionist' accounts. Rather, it expresses the emergence of a contested, fragmented, decentralized and unevenly internationalized governance regime within China.
Conclusion
The establishment of the AIIB has generated considerable debate over whether China poses a challenge to the established global governance of IDF. We agree with the more sanguine accounts that identify little substantive difference between the AIIB and existing MDBs. In fact, as noted above, most AIIB-funded projects to date are partnerships with other MDBs. Therefore, claims that the AIIB reflects Chinese revisionism appear misplaced. However, we have shown in this article that this debate is in fact a red herring, because the AIIB is only a marginal player within China's broader IDF domain, even in implementing the BRI, the purpose for which it was ostensibly created. We have explained this discrepancy by locating the AIIB within China's fragmented IDF domain. As in policy-making and implementation more generally, this fragmentation is producing behaviours and outcomes that are often incoherent, even contradictory. The senior leadership's relatively broad policy announcements are interpreted through a competitive process involving diverse actors, including ministries, subnational governments, 94 Lee Jones and Jinghan Zeng, 'Understanding China's "belt and road initiative": beyond grand strategy to a state transformation analysis', unpublished manuscript (under review), 2017.
International Affairs 94: 3, 2018 banks and SOEs. Therefore, China's real challenge to global governance in this area emerges not simply, or even primarily, from the Chinese leadership's strategic intentions, but rather from the contested interactions of these actors. There is some cause for pessimism here. The overwhelming dominance of commercial objectives in a highly competitive environment, combined with continuing regulatory weakness, means that China's impact on the practices and governance of development financing globally is likely to be negative. While some see the AIIB as Chinese experimentation in 'best practice' lending, potentially importing international standards into the Chinese system, 95 we are not convinced. The AIIB's marginalization means it has very limited capacity to influence the practices of other agencies; and it is arguably its very internalization of international standards that prompts its marginalization. Hence, even if AIIB-funded projects displayed the world's highest standards of environmental and social protection, the vast majority of Chinese-funded projects will not be similarly regulated. The quality of Chinese-funded projects could be improved by demands from recipients, but regulatory and political circumstances in recipient states vary widely.
The foregoing analysis does not suggest that policy-makers in other countries should avoid engaging with Chinese global governance initiatives. Indeed, the involvement of traditional donors appears to have played a key role in steering the AIIB closer to international governance standards. But the consequences of China's rise for the existing rules-based, liberal international order will not be shaped solely by Chinese leaders' intentions and their manifestation within the rules of multilateral organizations. Perhaps more important is the cumulative effect of the diverse activities of a wide range of actors involved in particular projects, their objectives, and their struggles for power and resources. It is these dynamics, rather than Xi's aspirations, that constitute China's real challenge to global governance. Thus, to mitigate the negative impacts of China's IDF activities, policy-makers and practitioners elsewhere must develop a capacity to analyse power relations at the level of individual projects, as well as ways of engaging actors, whether in China or recipient states, with the power to exert pressure for better governance standards. China's fragmented IDF system requires a targeted policy response, tailored for each project's circumstances. 95 De Jonge, 'Perspectives on the emerging role of the AIIB', p. 1064.
